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Date: 03-23-2021
Case Style:
BARBARA COUCH, vs. ABUBAKAR ATIQ DURRANI, M.D., and CENTER FOR ADVANCED SPINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and CHRIST HOSPITAL
Case Number: C-190703, C-190704, C-190705, C-190706, C-190707
Judge: Candace C. Crouse
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
Plaintiff's Attorney:
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Description:
Cincinnati, OH - Malpractice attorney represented Abubakar Atiq Durrani, M.D with a medical-malpractice case.
Appellants are five former patients of Durrani, a spinal surgeon who
formerly operated at defendant-appellee The Christ Hospital (“TCH”). Appellants
underwent various spinal surgeries with Durrani between April 2007 and April
2009. Appellants allege that their surgeries were among the hundreds of medically
unnecessary surgeries performed by Durrani.
{¶3} Central to this appeal, appellants claim that TCH negligently
credentialed, supervised, and retained Durrani as a credentialed physician.
Appellants allege that TCH failed to adequately evaluate Durrani’s educational
background, work history, and peer reviews when he applied for privileges at TCH.
Appellants further allege that TCH knew about Durrani’s fraudulent scheme, and yet,
continued granting him surgical privileges and allowing him to operate at its
facilities. According to appellants, TCH willfully disregarded complaints about
Durrani reported by its staff, doctors, and patients; ignored complaints pertaining to
Durrani’s privileged time at other area hospitals; and settled several cases involving
Durrani’s alleged misconduct. Appellants ultimately contend that TCH allowed and
encouraged Durrani’s conduct in order to enhance its revenues. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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{¶4} When allegations of the fraudulent scheme surfaced, appellants
separately filed complaints against Durrani and TCH.1 Young filed her complaint in
May 2015. Couch, Green, Simmons, and Cook filed their complaints in December
2018. The claims asserted against TCH—which are the subjects of this appeal—
included fraud and negligent credentialing, supervision and retention. In each case,
TCH filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the claims were filed outside the fouryear medical-malpractice statute of repose. Agreeing with TCH, the trial court found
appellants’ claims were barred by the statute of repose and dismissed all of the cases
with prejudice.
{¶5} Appellants filed separate appeals and this court sua sponte
consolidated the five cases. Appellants collectively raise one assignment of error.
II. Legal Standard & Analysis
{¶6} In their sole assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial
court erred by granting TCH’s motions to dismiss. We review de novo a trial court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Perrysburg
Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5.
{¶7} The motions to dismiss focused on the applicability of R.C.
2305.113(C), Ohio’s four-year medical-malpractice statute of repose. Appellants’
claims arose from various spinal surgeries performed by Durrani between April
2007 and April 2009. But all of appellants’ complaints were filed more than four
years after their respective surgeries—the earliest complaint filed in May 2015.
Therefore, the statute of repose presumptively bars their claims.
1 Appellants Couch, Cook, and Simmons also named Durrani’s practice, the Center for Advanced
Spine Technologies, Inc., as a defendant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
6
{¶8} Appellants argue that their claims fall outside the scope of R.C.
2305.113, and therefore, the statute of repose is inapplicable to their claims.
However, all of appellants’ arguments are foreclosed by our recent precedent.
A. Negligent-Credentialing Claims
{¶9} First, appellants argue that their negligent-credentialing claims are not
“medical claims” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.113(C). Appellants also argue that
a “physician” is not a “caregiver” for purposes of R.C. 2305.113(E)(3)(b)(ii).
Appellants contend that “caregiver” is a generic term that refers only to nurses,
nurses’ aides, and housekeeping staff.
{¶10} In Young v. Durrani, 2016-Ohio-5526, 61 N.E.3d 34 (1st Dist.), we
held that negligent-credentialing claims are “medical claims” as defined in R.C.
2305.113(E)(3)(b)(ii). We have twice reaffirmed the holding in Young. See
Crissinger v. Christ Hospital, 2017-Ohio-9256, 106 N.E.3d 798 (1st Dist.) (“Our
previous holding in Young established that the claims for negligence, negligent
credentialing, and fraud were ‘medical claims’ within the statute of repose, and we
follow that holding in these cases.”); McNeal v. Durrani, 2019-Ohio-5351, 138
N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.) (“We see no reason to depart from this line of cases and
accordingly find these plaintiffs’ negligent credentialing claims likewise present
‘medical claims’ barred here by the statute of repose.”).
{¶11} Appellants now ask us to overrule this line of cases. Appellants argue
that Young is in conflict with Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993
(1993), and its progeny.
{¶12} In Browning, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished a negligentcredentialing claim against a hospital from a medical claim alleging malpractice
against a physician. Browning interpreted former R.C. 2305.11, which narrowly OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
7
defined a “medical claim” as “any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a
physician, podiatrist, or hospital, * * * and that arises out of the medical diagnosis,
care, or treatment of any person.” The court reasoned, “Negligent credentialing
claims arise out of the hospital’s failure to satisfy its independent duty to grant and
continue staff privileges only to competent physicians. This independent duty does
not directly involve diagnosis or the medical care and treatment of a patient.” Id. at
557. Accordingly, the court held that a negligent-credentialing claim is not subject to
the medical-malpractice statute of limitations. Id. at 558.
{¶13} In an attempt to supersede Browning, the General Assembly redefined
the term “medical claim” to explicitly include negligent credentialing. See 1996
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 (“H.B. 350”). Pursuant to H.B. 350, a “medical claim”
included “a claim that is asserted * * * against a hospital and that is based on
negligent credentialing.” In 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court held that H.B. 350
violated the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution and was unconstitutional in its
entirety. See State ex rel. Ohio Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715
N.E.2d 1062 (1999). To address the procedural deficiency, the General Assembly
subsequently enacted 2002 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 281 (“S.B. 281”). S.B. 281 moved the
definition of a “medical claim” to the newly-enacted R.C. 2305.113 and re-expanded
the definition to include claims arising from “the hiring, training, supervision,
retention, or termination of caregivers providing medical diagnosis, care, or
treatment.”
{¶14} The case law that has evolved since the 2002 statute is not particularly
helpful to the issue presented in this case—whether a negligent-credentialing claim is
a “medical claim” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.113. Appellants argue that the OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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Ohio Supreme Court’s recent decision in Evans v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., Slip
Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5535, reaffirmed Browning. We disagree.
{¶15} In Evans, the plaintiff-patient alleged that she had been sexually
assaulted by a treating physician at the defendant-hospital. Id. at ¶ 2. The plaintiff
immediately filed a criminal complaint against the doctor, but the police declined to
pursue criminal charges. Id. The plaintiff did not file a civil action against the doctor
within the one-year statute of limitations for civil battery. Id. Instead, the plaintiff
brought a claim for negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention against the
hospital within the two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions. Id. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital, holding that the hospital
could not be liable for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision where the doctor
could not be found civilly liable or guilty of the underlying sexual assault. Id.
{¶16} The main issue on appeal was whether an employee must be found
civilly liable or guilty of a crime before a plaintiff can sue an employer for negligent
hiring, supervision, or retention. As a corollary to that issue, the Ohio Supreme
Court also had to consider whether the claim for negligent hiring, supervision, or
retention was limited by the one-year statute of limitations for civil battery.
{¶17} With respect to the second issue—which is the basis of appellants’
argument—the court held that the statute of limitations for negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention was not affected by the statute of limitations for the
underlying conduct. Id. at ¶ 12. The court had determined that “a plaintiff need not
show that an employee has been adjudicated civilly liable or has been found guilty of
a crime * * * in order * * * to maintain a negligent hiring, retention, or supervision
claim against an employer.” Id. at ¶ 10. Because an employee need not be held
legally accountable to maintain a viable action against the employer, the court OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
9
concluded that a negligent hiring, retention, and/or supervision claim is governed
solely by the bodily-injury statute of limitations. Id.
{¶18} Notably, Evans did not address whether a negligent-credentialing
claim (a separate but related claim) is a “medical claim.” Neither party in that case
disputed that a claim for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention was subject to
the two-year bodily-injury statute of limitations. Rather, the parties disputed
whether the plaintiff’s failure to file a civil action against the employee within that
limitations period foreclosed the plaintiff’s ability to later prove a claim for negligent
hiring, supervision, and retention against the employer. Thus, Evans is not
controlling and does not affect our prior precedent. We determine that the Ohio
Supreme Court has not otherwise ruled on the issue since the General Assembly
amended and expanded the definition of “medical claim.”
{¶19} Although the court did not explicitly address the issue, the decision in
Evans actually supports a finding that negligent-credentialing claims are “medical
claims” for purposes of R.C. 2305.113. In Evans, the court clarified that claims for
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention are “claim[s] against an employer * * *
that would not have occurred but for the employer’s failure to properly hire,
supervise, or retain the employee.” Evans, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5535, at ¶
10. As detailed above, the current and applicable version of R.C. 2305.113 defines a
“medical claim” as a claim resulting from the “hiring, training, supervision,
retention, or termination of caregivers[.]” Therefore, while the Ohio Supreme Court
has not determined whether a negligent-credentialing claim is a “medical claim” for
purposes of current legislation, it has defined related claims to reflect the amended
definition of “medical claim.” Thus, there is no reason to depart from our decision in
Young. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
10
{¶20} Appellants’ argument that Durrani was not a “caregiver” is likewise
unpersuasive. The General Assembly did not define the word “caregiver” in the
statute, nor have we done so in our prior opinions. Under the plain and ordinary
meaning of the word, a “caregiver” is “a person who provides direct care (as for
children, elderly people, or the chronically ill).” Merriam-Webster’s Online
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caregiver (accessed Mar.
4, 2021).
{¶21} R.C. 2305.113(E) specifically refers to caregivers who provide “medical
diagnosis, care, or treatment.” The terms “medical diagnosis,” “care,” and
“treatment” relate to “the identification[,] [prevention,] and alleviation of a physical
or mental illness, disease, or defect.” Browning, 66 Ohio St.3d at 557, 613 N.E.2d
993 (discussing the terms as analogously used in former R.C. 2305.11). By law, the
diagnosis of a medical condition and the prescription of a course of treatment are
limited to licensed physicians. Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 579, 613
N.E.2d 1014 (1993). Therefore, “caregiver” is a broad term that necessarily includes
a physician.
{¶22} Based on the foregoing, appellants have not presented a compelling
reason to overrule our holdings in Young, Crissinger, and McNeal. Applying our
precedent, appellants’ negligent-credentialing claims are “medical claims” as defined
in R.C. 2305.113. Thus, their claims are barred by the statute of repose.
B. Fraud and Equitable-Estoppel Exceptions
{¶23} Next, appellants urge us to recognize a fraud exception and/or an
equitable-estoppel exception to the statute of repose.
{¶24} In Freeman v. Durrani, 2019-Ohio-3643, 144 N.E.3d 1067 (1st Dist.),
we refused to craft a fraud or equitable-estoppel exception to the statute of repose. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
11
We found that the General Assembly intentionally chose not to create such
exceptions for medical claims, and determined that “this court should not substitute
its judgment for that legislative choice.” Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶25} Appellants now ask us to overrule Freeman. However, appellants do
not present any compelling reason to depart from our holding in Freeman. Instead,
appellants argue that equitable principles and public-policy considerations demand a
different result.
{¶26} The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently held that “R.C. 2305.113(C)
is a true statute of repose that * * * clearly and unambiguously precludes the
commencement of a medical claim more than four years after the occurrence of the
alleged act or omission that forms the basis of the claim.” Wilson v. Durrani, Slip
Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6827, ¶ 38; Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 148 Ohio
St.3d 483, 2016-Ohio-7432, 71 N.E.3d 974, ¶ 1. Thus, “[w]e must heed the plain
language of this unambiguous statute, and any claim of injustice or inequity must be
resolved through the legislative process rather than judicial redress.” State v.
Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236, 28 N.E.3d 1267, ¶ 16.
{¶27} We again decline appellants’ invitation to create a fraud or equitableestoppel exception to R.C. 2305.113(C).
C. Fraud Claims
{¶28} Finally, appellants argue that their fraud claims are independent
nonmedical claims not governed by the statute of repose.
{¶29} In Freeman and McNeal, we examined the same arguments presented
by appellants herein and held that fraud claims relating to a physician’s treatment
are “medical claims” under R.C. 2305.113. Those cases encompassed allegations of
recommending unnecessary surgery, failing to disclose the risks of surgery, OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
12
misinforming the patient about the outcome of the surgery, and concealing
information to avoid civil liability.
{¶30} Appellants again ask us to overrule Freeman. However, appellants do
not present any new reason to depart from our holding in Freeman. Thus,
appellants’ fraud claims are “medical claims” subject to the four-year statute of
repose.
Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellants’ sole assignment of error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
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